Complex demonstratives, expressions of the form 'That F', 'These Fs', etc., have traditionally been taken to be referring terms. Yet they exhibit many of the features of quantified noun phrases. This has led some philosophers to suggest that demonstrative determiners are a special kind of quantifier, which can be paraphrased using a context sensitive definite description. Both these views contain elements of the truth, though each is mistaken. We advance a novel account of the semantic form of complex demonstratives that (...) shows how to reconcile the view that they function like quantified noun phrases with the view that simple demonstratives function as context sensitive referring terms wherever they occur. If we are right, previous accounts of complex demonstratives have misconceived their semantic role; and philosophers relying on the majority view in employing complex demonstratives in analysis have proceeded on a false assumption. (shrink)

Our aim in the present paper is to investigate, from the standpoint of truth-theoretic semantics, English tense, temporal designators and quantifiers, and other expressions we use to relate ourselves and other things to the temporal order. Truth-theoretic semantics provides a particularly illuminating standpoint from which to discuss issues about the semantics of tense, and their relation to thoughts at, and about, times. Tense, and temporal modifiers, contribute systematically to conditions under which sentences we utter are true or false. A Tarski-style (...) truth-theoretic semantics, by requiring explicitly represented truth conditions, helps to sharpen questions about the function of tense, and to deepen our insight into the contribution the tenses and temporal modifiers make to what we say by using them. (shrink)

Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within epistemology (...) while engaging in contemporary debates. Written by two of today’s foremost epistemologists. Includes an extensive bibliography. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the External World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as he (...) called them, ‘logical forms’. This portion of logic he called ‘philosophical logic’. Russell asserted that ... some kind of knowledge of logical forms, though with most people it is not explicit, is involved in all understanding of discourse. It is the business of philosophical logic to extract this knowledge from its concrete integuments, and to render it explicit and pure. (p. 53) Perhaps no one still endorses quite this grand a view of the role of logic and the investigation of logical form in philosophy. But talk of logical form retains a central role in analytic philosophy. Given its widespread use in philosophy and linguistics, it is rather surprising that the concept of logical form has not received more attention by philosophers than it has. The concern of this paper is to say something about what talk of logical form comes to, in a tradition that stretches back to (and arguably beyond) Russell’s use of that expression. This will not be exactly Russell’s conception. For we do not endorse Russell’s view that propositions are the bearers of logical form, or that appeal to propositions adds anything to our understanding of what talk of logical form comes to. But we will be concerned to provide an account responsive to the interests expressed by Russell in the above quotations, though one clarified of extraneous elements, and expressed precisely. For this purpose, it is important to note that the concern expressed by Russell in the above passages, as the surrounding text makes clear, is a concern not just with logic conceived narrowly as the study of logical terms, but with propositional form more generally, which includes, e.g., such features as those that correspond to the number of argument places in a propositional function, and the categories of objects which propositional.... (shrink)

This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

This paper advances a general argument, inspired by some remarks of Davidson, to show that appeal to meanings as entities in the theory of meaning is neither necessary nor sufficient for carrying out the tasks of the theory of meaning. The crucial point is that appeal to meaning as entities fails to provide us with an understanding of any expression of a language except insofar as we pick it out with an expression we understand which we tacitly recognize to be (...) a translation of the term whose meaning we want to illuminate by the appeal to assigning to it a meaning. The meaning drops out as irrelevant: the work is done, and can only be done, by matching terms already understood with terms they translate. (shrink)

This paper responds to a critical review of our 2005 book Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality, by Frederick Stoutland. It identifies a number of serious misreadings of both Davidson and the book.

My dissertation argues that Plato composed the figure of Socrates as a three- dimensional literary character who experiences and confronts emotions in ways that other studies have overlooked. By adopting a dramatic, non-dogmatic mode of reading the dialogues and emphasizing the literary elements of the texts and their dramatic connections, this dissertation offers a new and compelling portrait of Socrates in the dialogues that relate his finals weeks of life: Theaetetus, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. This study in turn provides (...) new insights into the genre of Plato’s texts and demonstrates how he exploited the dramatic nature of the prose dialogue to capture social-historical realities surrounding the trial and execution of Socrates. By emphasizing emotional and interpersonal aspects of Plato’s texts, my dissertation shows that Plato’s dialogues are profitably read through a literary lens to recover their complex reconstruction of Socrates’ place and time in history. (shrink)

Davidson’s epistemology, like Kant’s, features a transcendental argument as its centerpiece. Both philosophers reject any priority, whether epistemological or conceptual, of the subjective over the objective, attempting thus to solve the problem of the external world. For Davidson, three varieties of knowledge are coordinate—knowledge of the self, of other minds, and of the external world. None has priority. Despite the epistemologically coordinate status of the mind and the world, however, the content of the mind can be shown to entail how (...) it is out in the world. More exactly, Davidson argues, we could not possibly have the beliefs we have, with their contents, unless the world around us was pretty much the way we take it to be, at least in its general outline. We are thus offered a way to argue, to all appearances a priori, from how it is in our minds to how it is in the world. The argument is a priori at least in being free of premises or assumptions about contingent particularities concerning the world around us or our relation to it. From premises about the contents of our propositional attitudes, the argument wends its way to a conclusion about the general lines of how the world around us is structured and populated. Before presenting his own account, Davidson rejects received views of meaning and knowledge. What follows will combine themes from his critique of alternatives with his more positive account and how it deals with the skeptic. (shrink)

Twenty-first century science faces a dilemma. Two of its well-verified foundation stones - relativity and quantum theory - have proven inconsistent. Resolution of the conflict has resisted improvements in experimental precision leaving some to believe that some fundamental understanding in our world-view may need modification or even radical reform. Employment of the wave-front model of electrodynamics, as a propagation process with a Markov property, may offer just such a clarification.

William L. Rowe cites Stephen Wykstra's skeptical theism as the most powerful objection to the evidential argument. Initially, I object to skeptical theism on the basis that skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis. I then will conclude that the skeptical theist has other resources that enable the formation of a moral code.

The main concept of quantum field theory is the conviction that all the phenomena in the universe are created by the underlying structure of the quantum fields. Fields represent dynamical spatial properties that can be described with the help of geometrical concepts. Therefore it is possible to describe the mathematical origin of the structure of the creating fields and show the mathematical origin of the law of conservation of energy, Planck’s constant and the constant speed of light within a non-local (...) universe. (shrink)

Modern physics describes the observable – and proposed – relations between the phenomena in the microcosm and macrocosm. Unfortunately we cannot observe non-local space itself. Therefore we can only determine the dynamics of the mathematical structure of space with the help of the universal properties of phenomenological reality. It has consequences too.

The proposed existence of relative time and the curvature of space – both combined into the concept of spacetime – influences the search for an adequate theoretical model that can describe the structure of space in an accurate way. The aim of building space is to develop a quantum theory of gravitation. This paper investigate the theoretical problems that have their origin in the concepts that are at the basis of phenomenological physics.

With the surge of the COVID-19 pandemic, online sellers faced challenges in managing their online business daily. Aside from it, their work-life balance has been negatively affected as well, considering that they work from home and are responsible for household responsibilities. Thus, this study is conducted during the pandemic and gathered data using a semi-structured interview through Messenger call. It is conducted to explore the lived experiences of online sellers and how they managed their online business and personal life. It (...) also determines the specific challenges they’ve encountered and how they coped with them. Lastly, this study aims to map out how these experiences will benefit online sellers and consumers and explain that online selling can be both sustainable and convenient in terms of earning a good living and meeting their daily needs. Moreover, three major conclusions emerged from this study’s findings: (1) online sellers faced psychological and physical difficulties in managing their online business during the pandemic, (2) online sellers discovered ways on how to cope with the struggles they are facing, and (3) online sellers reflected on their experience to be more effective in the online selling industry. (shrink)

Changes within observable reality at the lowest level of reality seem to occur in accordance with the probabil­ity theory in mathematics. It is quite remarkable that nature itself has chosen the probability theory to ar­range all the changes within the structure of the basic quantum fields. This rises a question about the distri­bution of properties in space and time. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.5515861.

The concept of discrete space can be termed as “the ex­ternal mathematical reality hypothesis”. The concept was already known among the ancient Greek philosophers (≈ 500 BC). Unfortunately the phenomenological point of view has dominated science during more than 2000 years and it is only recently that the concept of discrete space gets “tangible” attention again in philosophy and theoretical physics. Although the model de­scribes the existence of the universal conservation laws, constants and principles in a convincing way, the re­lation (...) between phenomenological reality and the geo­metrical description of discrete space is difficult to ima­gine for everyone who is only familiar with phenomeno­logical reality. The purpose of this paper is to describe some easy to imagine properties of discrete space. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.5498120. (shrink)

Changes within observable reality at the lowest level of reality seem to occur in accordance with the probability theory in mathematics. It is quite remarkable that nature itself has chosen the probability theory to arrange all the changes within the structure of the basic quantum fields. This rises a question about the distribution of properties in space and time.

During the 20th century there were a couple of scientists who announced the observation of exceptional heat during the electrolysis of water with the help of Palladium electrodes. In spite of the opinion of the community of nuclear physicists that low energy generated nuclear fusion is a hoax there is a lot of research to understand and create the observed emission of exceptional electromagnetic radiation. This paper explains with the help of the concept of quantized space the simple mechanism that (...) is responsible for the decrease of the Coulomb force of Hydrogen nuclei, established by Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons. (shrink)

Albert Einstein’s theory of General Relativity was once the leading theory in theoretical physics. Unfortunately the theory describes macroscopic reality without a clear link with the the microcosm in respect to the properties of spacetime. However the theory of General Relativity has proved to predict macroscopic phenomena in a very accurate way. Nowadays most theoretical physicists use the conceptual framework of quantum theory. So it is not surprisingly that the question about the “true nature” of spacetime becomes very intrigue.

The force of gravity is the result of the creation of matter within vacuum space by the structure of the basic quantum fields. The scalar vectors of the flat Higgs field lost their symmetry and the result are scalar vectors from everywhere around in vacuum space that point in the direction of the created matter. Gravity shows to be a push force and is equal to Newtonian gravity (except the concept of a pull force).

The ancient Greek philosophers – like Parmenides – reasoned that observable reality cannot exist by itself. It has to be a creation of an underlying reality. An all-in­clusive existence that has a structure because observable reality shows structure at every scale size. Although observable reality is involved in a continuous transformation too. If our concept about the relation between phenomenological reality and the creating underlying reality is correct, the unification of the properties of phenomenological reality is part of an enveloping (...) mathematical model. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.5457368. (shrink)

Phenomenological reality seems to be a never ending transformation of observable events. A sequence of successive observable alterations that is called “time”. Actually phenomenological reality exists only “at the front” of the evolving transformations. A state of reality we have termed “now”. However, what is the physical reality of the concept “now”? Does it depends on the properties of the human consciousness or is the state of reality “now” existent everywhere in the universe, even in vacuum space?

Phenomenological reality is created by the underlying structure of the basis quantum fields and not the opposite. In cosmology this isn’t the leading concept. Cosmologists share a different concept, the Standard cosmological model. Unfortunately, the general concept of quantum field theory doesn’t predict the expansion of space and the concentration of all the energy of the universe in one little spot. The paper describes the consequences.

nature as well as an inevitable, and useful academic exercise. However, there exist controversies in the use of statistical techniques in the conduct and writing of research in theatre scholarship. Some theatre scholars frown at its usage while others see it as a veritable tool in conducting investigation to solve identifiable problems in theatre and its allied fields. In the midst of these controversies, this study seeks to address the imbalances by examining the appropriateness in the use of statistical techniques (...) in the contemporary theatre scholarship. To this end, the online survey research method and the questionnaire instrument were applied in gathering and analyzing data towards arriving at a dependable conclusion. The findings show that majority of theatre scholars approved the continuous use of statistical research techniques in theatre scholarship despite its challenges. Thereafter, the study concludes that there is need for theatre scholars to be innovative and experienced in statistical techniques in conducting and writing research and defend it in written and oral forms when the need arises. (shrink)

This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central (...) topics such as the nature of consciousness. Next a counterfactual account of intuitions proposed by Sosa is criticized. Finally, in response to certain questions raised by Sosa, the explanation of the evidential status of intuition offered in the original paper receives further elaboration. (shrink)

The theories of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker arise from an existential and psychological analysis of the death terror/anxiety deep in the unconscious of every human. Becker details how this anxiety governs the ideologies and behaviors of our species—something now confirmed by thousands of experiments performed by psychologists engaged in contemporary terror management theory (TMT). Humans manage their anxiety through what Becker terms “hero systems”—concepts, beliefs, and myths we create to give us a sense of significance and meaning during, and (...) even beyond our mortal lives. Today, many dominant economic, technological, and religious hero systems seek to confirm our significance by denying that we are—like all other species—animals who must exist in a decaying, mortal body. Becker shows how this attempt to deny our “creatureliness” (basic biological nature) causes humans to stand against the natural world we are embedded in, leading to an assault on the planet and nonhuman animals. As a result, Becker believed pacifism was the only hero system capable of keeping humankind from destroying itself and the earth. Pacifism is the precursor to the more encompassing ethical concept of “reverence for life,” advocated by Dr. Albert Schweitzer. By respecting the will-to-live in all sentient beings, reverence for life transcends concern for humans alone and extends moral and physical safeguards to life as such. Confronting the fact that humans are increasingly alienated from their commodified world and their own being, reverence for life stands as a vital solution to many of our modern problems. And following contemporary TMT research, reverencing life can also expand one’s self-esteem, which research shows lowers death anxiety, reduces aggression, and offers authentic meaning to life itself. (shrink)

يلقي سوسا ( -1940) في هذا الكتاب المسائل الكلاسيكية والمعاصرة في نظرية المعرفة، ويعرض مشكلاتها، ويقترح لها الحلول. بداية من الشكية، ومرورا بمشكلة جيتير، والنزاع بين نزعة الأسس ونزعة الاتساق على بنية المعرفة، والخلاف بين النزعة الخارجية والنزعة الداخلية على طبيعة المعرفة، وانتهاء بالدفاع عن إبستمولوجيا الفضيلة التي أسسها واستهل البحث فيها عام 1980، ويناقش العلاقة بين أنصار الثقة وأنصار المسئولية في هذا الفرع المعرفي الجديد. وأنت حين تطالع عرض سوسا لمسائل المعرفة إنما تطالع عقلا ناقدا وفكرا دقيقا في طبيعة (...) المعرفة، ومجالها، وأنواعها ومستوياتها، وقيمتها، والفضيلة أو القدرة المعرفية التي تكون هذه المعرفة. وستجد أيضا أنه يكشف المضمون الحقيقي لفلسفة ديكارت في المعرفة مع مصادرها القديمة، ويقدم تطويرا معاصرا للبناء الديكارتي يقوم على العلم والحس المشترك وليس اللاهوت كما فعل ديكارت. شكلت كتابات سوسا معالم البحث المعرفي المعاصر على مدار أربعة عقود أو يزيد. ومن الخير أن يظهر قراء العربية على هذا الكتاب الخليق بالعناية، وعلى فلسفة مؤلفه الحقيق أن يلقب الآن بعميد الإبستمولوجيا. وقيل عن المؤلف والكتاب:"لا يوجد فيلسوف حي في الوقت الحاضر يفهم الإبستمولوجيا فهما مفصلا وشاملا وواضحا مثلما يفهمها إرنست سوسا. وهذا كتاب تنويري ومرشد كأشد ما يكون التنوير والإرشاد". -/- In this concise book, one of the world’s leading epistemologists provides a sophisticated, revisionist introduction to the problem of knowledge in Western philosophy. Modern and contemporary accounts of epistemology tend to focus on limited questions of knowledge and skepticism, such as how we can know the external world, other minds, the past through memory, the future through induction, or the world’s depth and structure through inference. This book steps back for a better view of the more general issues posed by the ancient Greek Pyrrhonists. Returning to and illuminating this older, broader epistemological tradition, Ernest Sosa develops an original account of the subject, giving it substance not with Cartesian theology but with science and common sense. Descartes is a part of this ancient tradition, but he goes beyond it by considering not just whether knowledge is possible in the first place, but also how we can properly attain it. In Cartesian epistemology, Sosa finds a virtue-theoretic account, one that he extends beyond the Cartesian context. Once epistemology is viewed in this light, many of its problems can be solved or fall away. The result is an important reevaluation of epistemology that will be essential reading for students and teachers. -/- . (shrink)

A lexicographical entry on "Ernest Sosa".

After a brief introduction and orientation (section I), this dialogue between Levinasian and Beckerian thought is approached along the lines of two major themes concerning consciousness which emerge in very different contexts and registers in their work (sections II and III), and one tantalizing question that is raised with great force by the dialogue (section IV). The two themes revolve around the subtle dialectical interplay that runs throughout the thought of both Levinas and Becker – the switching between internality and (...) externality, non-rational and rational; otherness and sameness; life and death – an interplay that is summed up in the dialectic between non-reflexive and reflexive consciousness. The Beckerian and Levinasian notions of the non-reflexive consciousness (section II) relate to their respective and in many ways convergent claims about a non-rational primal human state characterized by global vulnerability, awe and guilt, especially before the face of the other. Their analyses of reflexive consciousness (section III) relate to their interpretations of the problematic ideal of the free, self-constituting and self-mastering individual, and the impetus located therein towards the repression of what is Other to the self. Finally (section IV), the question is raised as to whether (and to what extent), following Levinas, sources of compelling ethical value might be legitimately understood as emerging out of Becker’s conception of primordial human vulnerability. (shrink)

This chapter presents the reception of Leo Strauss by analytic philosophers after Strauss’s emigration to the United States. It gives a brief survey of the polemics against Strauss and his school by analytic philosophers, which aided in the self-constitution of analytic philosophy as a rival school of thought in philosophy. But most of the chapter is devoted to recovering the significance and influence of a criticism of Strauss by Ernest Nagel. The chapter argues that this response is of intrinsic (...) interest because it involves the relationship between science and values. Nagel’s response was foundational to Felix Oppenheim’s political philosophy or what Oppenheim called his project of ‘conceptual reconstruction.’ Lurking in Oppenheim’s response to Strauss are questions about the role of the principle of sufficient reason in philosophy. Rge chapter argues that an opportunity was missed to clarify questions pertaining to the inductive risk of philosophy more than a half century before these issues became fashionable again. (shrink)

This lecture illustrates some of the theoretical richness that emerges from thinking about self-aware agents. It argues that taking self-awareness into account yields a picture of rational belief that is surprising, in a number of different, but interconnected, ways. The complexities it focuses on emerge most clearly in cases that involve so-called “higher-order evidence.”.

Indonesia has recently faced problems in various aspects of life. The results of a social media survey in Indonesia in early 2021 that the biggest threat to the Pancasila ideology is communism and other western ideologies. Communism has a dark history in the life of the Indonesian people. It shows the problem of thinking and philosophical views of the Indonesian people. This research is textbook research that aims to analyze philosophy books, namely mathematics education philosophy textbooks written with a Western (...) cultural background by Paul Ernest. This book was chosen as the object of analysis because this book is the essential reference textbook for the philosophy of mathematics education in universities providing prospective mathematics teachers in Indonesia. The research results show that this book contributes to developing Western thoughts that are contrary to Pancasila. It needs to eliminate the most critical thing in this book. It is the atheistic and individualistic philosophy underlying the ideology of mathematics education because this is not in line with the theistic collectivistic Pancasila. Therefore, this research recommends developing a textbook on the philosophy of mathematics education. It should be under the Pancasila ideology or written based on the Pancasila ideology. (shrink)

This chapter explores Nagel’s polemics. It shows these have a two-fold character: (i) to defend liberal civilization against all kinds of enemies. And (ii) to defend what he calls ‘contextual naturalism.’ And the chapter shows that (i-ii) reinforce each other and undermine alternative political and philosophical programs. The chapter’s argument responds to an influential argument by George Reisch that Nagel’s professional stance represents a kind of disciplinary retreat from politics. In order to respond to Reisch the relationship between Nagel’s philosophy (...) of science and his politics is explored and this chapter shows how both are anchored in what Nagel once called his ‘contextual naturalism’—a metaphysics that resists imposing the unity of the world and treats all entities as embedded in a wider network of entities. Part of the argument traces out how Nagel’s views on responsible speech and professionalism reflect a distinct understanding of the political role of philosophers of science. (shrink)

The global relation between logical empiricism and American pragmatism is one of the more difficult problems in history of philosophy. In this paper I’d like to take a local perspective and concentrate on the details that concern the vicissitudes of a philosopher who played an important role in the encounter of logical empiricism and American pragmatism, namely, Ernest Nagel. In this paper, I want to explore some aspects of Nagel’s changing attitude towards the then „new“ logical-empiricist philosophy. In the (...) beginning Nagel welcomed logical empiricism whole-heartedly. This early enthusiasm did not last. At the end of his philosophical career Nagel’s early positive attitude towards logical empiricism shown in the 1930s had been replaced by a much more reserved one. Nagel’s growing dissatisfaction with the Carnapian version of logical empiricist philosophy was clearly expressed in Nagel’s criticism of Carnap’s inductive logic and more generally in his last book Teleology Revisited and Other Essays on History and Philosophy of Science. There he critized harshly Carnap’s philosophy of science in general as ahistoric and non-pragmatist. One of the distinctive features of Nagel’s philosophy of science is the emphasis that he put on the role of history of science for philosophy of science. A compelling evidence for this attitude are his works on the history and philosophy of geometry and algebra One may say that Carnap and Nagel represented opposed possibilities of how the profession of a philosopher of science could be understood: Carnap as a „conceptual engineer“ was engaged in the task of inventing the conceptual tools for a better theoretical understanding of science, while Nagel was to be considered more as a „public intellectual“ engaged in the project of realizing a more rational and enlightened society. (shrink)

This chapter reviews the major contributions of Donald Davidson to philosophy in the 20th century.

This chapter reviews the work and influence of Donald Davidson across all the areas to which he contributed.

A bi-level account of trust is developed and defended, one with relevance in ethics as well as epistemology. The proposed account of trust—on which trusting is modelled within a virtue-theoretic framework as a performance-type with an aim—distinguishes between two distinct levels of trust, apt and convictive, that take us beyond previous assessments of its nature, value, and relationship to risk assessment. While Ernest Sosa (2009; 2015; 2017), in particular, has shown how a performance normativity model may be fruitfully applied (...) to belief, my objective is to apply this kind of model in a novel and principled way to trust. I conclude by outlining some of the key advantages of the performance-theoretic bi-level account of trust defended over more traditional univocal proposals. (shrink)

(2022) A meditation in regards to Ernest Becker's "Denial of Death," with immortality projects. What does it mean to "leave our mark on the world?".

Full aptness is the most important concept in performance-based virtue epistemology. The structure of full aptness, in epistemology and elsewhere, is bi-levelled. At the first level, we evaluate beliefs, like performances, on the basis of whether they are successful, competent, and apt – viz., successful because competent. But the fact that aptness itself can be fragile – as it is when an apt performance could easily have been inapt – points to a higher zone of quality beyond mere aptness. To (...) break in to this zone, one must not merely perform aptly but also in doing so safeguard in skilled ways against certain risks to inaptness. But how must this be done, exactly? This paper has two central aims. First, I challenge the credentials of mainstream thinking about full-aptness by raising some new and serious problems for the view. I then propose a novel account of full aptness – what I call de minimis normativism – which keeps all the advantages of the canonical view, avoids its problems entirely, and offers some additional payoffs. (shrink)

As Jaegwon Kim points out in his excellent new book, “reductionism” has become something of a pejorative term in philosophy and related disciplines. But originally (eg, as expressed in Ernest Nagel’s 1961 The Structure of Science) reduction was supposed to be a form of explanation, and one may wonder whether it is reasonable to reject in principle the advances in knowledge which such explanations may offer. Nagel’s own view, illustrated famously by the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, was (...) that reduction is a relation between theories: theory A is reduced to theory B by formulating “bridge laws” which link the terminology of the theories, and using them to derive A from B. (An additional reductive claim is that Aphenomena are identical with certain B-phenomena—as when the temperature of a gas is identified with its mean molecular kinetic energy—but this kind of identity claim is, strictly speaking, independent of the claim about theories.) Applied to the case of mental states and brain states, a reduction would provide explanatory relations between psychology and neuroscience, normally supplemented with the claim that mental properties are identical with physical properties in the brain. (shrink)

Physical phenomena emerge from the quantum fields everywhere in space. However, not only the phenomena emerge from the quantum fields, the law of the conservation of energy must have its origin from the same spatial structure. This paper describes the relations between the main law of physics, the universal constants and the mathematical structure of the “aggregated” quantum fields.

In the early part of the paper, I attempt to explain a dispute between two parties who endorse the compositionality of language but disagree about its implications: Paul Horwich, and Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In the remainder of the paper, I challenge the thesis on which they are agreed, that compositionality can be taken for granted. I suggest that it is not clear what compositionality involves nor whether it obtains. I consider some kinds of apparent counterexamples, and compositionalist (...) responses to them in terms of covert indexicality and unspecific meanings. I argue that the last option is the best for most of the cases I consider. I conclude by stressing, as against Horwich and Fodor and Lepore, that the appropriate question concerns the extent to which compositionality obtains in a natural language, rather than whether it obtains or not, so that the answer is essentially messy, requiring detailed consideration of a wide range of examples. (shrink)

This chapter identifies the central issue between Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson on the role of convention in language and argues they are not as far apart in the end as they take themselves to be.

Our universe shows to be local and non-local. The concept is confusing because in daily live we are not aware of the non-locality of our universe. Actually, in daily live local reality seems to be quite orderly and understandable. But we don’t know why everything is in motion and all our theories in physics are still approximations of physical reality. At least that is what they supposed to be.

Recently there is some new interest in understanding the physical reality behind the formalism of quantum mechanics. This paper relates the known “quantum mysteries” of QM with the properties of the underlying structure of discrete space. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.5236617.

The paper is about the basic properties of the structure of space and time. I wrote the very short paper to show that logic and mathematics are enough to determine the basic properties of the field structure of our universe.

In physics there are different opinions about the conceptual interpretation of Einstein’s famous equation that describes the equivalence between mass and energy. It is understandable that the equation has different interpretations because of the different points of view to interpret phenomenological reality. This paper is about the meaning of the equation in relation to the general concept of quantum field theory. In other words, reality is created by the underlying structure of the basic quantum fields.